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NINTH CIRCUIT COURT, State of 
Utah, Washington County, ) 
St. George Department, and 
ROBERT F. OWENS, Circuit Judge, ] 
Defendants-Appellants. ] 
Case No. 20976 
Category No. 13b 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in granting Plaintiffs 
extraordinary relief in the form of an order prohibiting the 
enforcement of the Circuit Court's directive revoking Plaintiffs' 
bonding authority? 
2. Did the District Court err in granting declaratory 
relief, adjudicating Plaintiffs' rights and obligations under the 
terms of the subject undertakings of bail? 
3. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 
subject undertakings of bail had been exonerated? 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiffs as bail bondsmen petitioned the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Washington County, for declaratory 
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ludgment adjudicating their rights and obligations under tne 
terms of certain undertakings of bail and further seeking 
extraordinary relief to the extent necessary to prohibit the 
Circuit Court's unjustified interference with Plaintiffs' bonding 
business or enforcement of bail bonds which Plaintiffs claim to 
have been exonerated. The District Court granted summary 
judgment declaring that the subject undertakings had been 
exonerated by operation of law and prohibiting the enforcement of 
the Circuit Court's directive revoking Plaintiffs' bonding 
authority, which directive had been issued without affording 
Plaintiffs notice or hearing. Defendants, the Ninth Circuit 
Court and Robert F. Owens, prosecute this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs have acted as bondsmen in the First Judicial 
District for a period of twenty (20) years. They applied for and 
were granted the authority to act as bondsmen in the Fifth 
District in January, 1984. By letter dated January 17, 1984, the 
Defendants, at times herein referred to as "The Circuit Court", 
approved Plaintiffs as bondsmen in the Ninth Circuit Court (R. 
51-52, 59-60). Plaintiffs, as authorized bondsmen, filed 
undertakings of bail with the Circuit Court in certain cases 
involving charges of driving under the influence (R. 18-19, 30-
39). 
Three individuals by the name of Benally, Marshall and 
Ashcroft, were charged with alcohol related offenses in the 
Circuit Court. Each was released on an undertaking of bail 
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provided by Plaintiffs. .. All-three .cf the above-mentioned 
individuals entered pleas of guilty and each were sentenced to 
sixty (60) days in the Washington County Jail with fifty-eight 
(58) days of each sentence being suspended. Each individual was 
also sentenced to pay a fine and granted probation subject to 
certain terms and conditions. Each of the individuals 
surrendered himself to the Sheriff of Washington County and 
served two days in the Washington County Jail beginning on 
January 19, 1985, February 1, 1985, and February 20, 1985, 
respectively (R. 20-22). 
Another individual by the name of Greening entered a 
plea of guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Greening had previously been released on undertaking of bail 
filed by Plaintiffs. On February 20, 1985, Greening was 
sentenced to serve sixty (60) days in the Washington County Jail. 
All but two days of his sentence was suspended and he was granted 
the privilege of probation subject to certain terms and 
conditions which included, as a part of sentence, the payment of 
a fine and surcharges. The Circuit Court, after entering 
judgment and pronouncing sentence, stayed the execution of the 
sentence until March 1# 1985. Greening failed to appear at the 
Washington County Jail (R. 22-23). 
Benally, Marshall and Ashcroft failed to abide by the 
terms of the probation granted each of them in failing to pay the 
fines as assessed as a part of their sentences (R. 20). 
Plaintiffs requested the exoneration of the above-
3
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mentioned undertakings or. the grounds and for the reasons that 
Benally, Marshall and Ashcroft had surrendered themselves in 
execution of the sentence and on the grounds that Greeningf from 
and after imposition of sentence, was in the custody of the 
Circuit Court rather than in the custody of his bondsman and that 
his bond was therefore exonerated by operation of law. The 
Circuit Court refused to exonerate these undertakings and took 
the position that the undertakings continue through the entire 
term of probation until all terms and conditions thereof had been 
met (R. 20-26). 
No judgments have been taken against Plaintiffs on any 
of the undertakings. 
This action was initiated by Plaintiffs in the Fifth 
District Court on May 28, 1985, seeking declaratory and/or 
extraordinary relief regarding their outstanding bonds. The 
following day, May 29, 1985, the Circuit Court, without notice or 
hearing revoked Plaintiffs' authorization to act as bail bondsman 
in the Ninth Circuit Court and advised the Washington County 
Sheriff that he was no longer authorized to accept Plaintiffs' 
bonds (R. 24-26). 
Thereafter, Plaintiffs amended their complaint seeking 
extraordinary relief and alleging that the Circuit Court's action 
in denying Plaintiffs authorization to file undertakings 
constituted an abuse of discretion and/or was undertaken in 
retaliation (R. 18-40). 
The Fifth District Court in the Summary Judgment from 
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v:rAich this appeal is takenr ruled that the enforcement of the 
Defendants' directive or order suspending or revoking Plaintiffsf 
bonding authority was prohibited unless and until Plaintiffs were 
provided with notice of the basis of any suspension or revocation 
and given opportunity for full hearing on the issues of their 
qualifications and fitness (R. 117-118). 
The District Court also ruled that the undertakings of 
bail filed on behalf of Benallyf Marshall, Ashcroft and Greening 
were exonerated and that Plaintiffs' obligation was fulfilled by 
producing the criminal defendant "at the times and places 
required by the Court up to and including the time of sentence 
and that the bail bond is exonerated upon the imposition of the 
Courts sentence" (R. 117-118). 
Plaintiffs submit that the foregoing is a brief but 
accurate statement of the relevant facts as submitted to the 
District Court. In their Brief, Defendants assert that 
Plaintiffs agreed to an oral expansion of the written bond 
obligation extending the liability on the bond throughout any 
period of probation which may ultimately be granted. This 
assertion was injected into the lawsuit by Affidavit of Judge 
Owens filed after the District Court ruled but before the 
execution and entry of the written pleadings (R. 95, 107). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs contend that the District Court acted 
properly and within its jurisdiction in considering the rights 
and obligations arising out of certain undertakings of bail, 
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Plaintiffs' complaint, clearly sought declaratory relief, the 
rights and obligations were a proper subject for declaratory 
relief and the record is devoid of any objection made on the 
basis of the unavailability of declaratory relief. 
Plaintiffs further contend that the Circuit Court acted 
outside of its discretion or abused its discretion in summarily 
revoking Plaintiffs' bonding authority and that the District 
Court acted appropriately in prohibiting the enforcement of that 
order until Plaintiffs were afforded due process of law. 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the District Court 
properly construed the statutory language relating to the 
duration and termination of a bondsman's obligation and ruled in 
harmony with traditional principles of criminal law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS POWER TO SUPERVISE THE 
CIRCUIT COURT BY EXTRAORDINARY WRIT. 
Article VIII, §5, Constitution of Utah, effective July 
1, 1985, provides in part as follows: 
The District court shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters except as limited by this constitution or 
by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. 
[Emphasis added] 
The power to issue such writs constitutes the power to 
supervise, at least within the limited scope of the writs. 
Section U.C.A. 78-3-4, clearly grants the District 
Court supervisory jurisdiction over the Circuit Court. It reads 
as follows: 
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The district court snal have original jurisdiction in 
all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the 
Constitution and not prohibited by law; appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and a supervisory control of the same. The district 
courts, or any judges thereof, shall have power to 
issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo 
warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and other writs 
necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments 
and decrees, and to give them a general control over 
inferior courts and tribunals within their respective 
jurisdictions. Under the general supervision of the 
chief judge of the judicial council and subject to 
policies established by the judicial council, cases 
filed in the district court, which are also within 
concurrent jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be 
transferred to the circuit court by the presiding judge 
of the district court in multiple judge districts, or 
the district court judge in single judge districts. 
The transfer of these cases may be made upon the 
court's own motion or upon the motion of either party 
for adjudication. When an order is made transferring a 
case, the court must transmit the pleadings and papers 
to the circuit court to which the case is transferred. 
The circuit court shall have the same jurisdiction as 
if the case had been originally commenced in the 
circuit court and,any appeals from final judgments 
shall run to the district court as provided for in 
section 78-4-11 unless the Supreme Court by writ of 
certiorari shall order the appeal heard by the Supreme 
Court. 
Defendants argue that this section is unconstitutional 
or has been repealed by implication as a result of the latest 
amendments to our State Constitution. Defendants provide us with 
no legislative history which would indicate that the Legislature 
intended or anticipated such a result. Indeed, this section was 
amended in 1983 to include all of the references to the Circuit 
Court and the Judicial Council. The Judicial Council acquired 
constitutional status the following year by the amendment of 
Article VIII of the Constitution of Utah. The Legislature has 
acted to harmonize the powers and authority of the District Court 
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with the responsibilities of the Judicial Council. Plaintiffs 
see nothing in the legislation or in the constitutional amendment 
which would indicate that the statute as amended and reenacted in 
1983 has been repealed by implication or that it is 
unconstitutional merely by reason of the fact that the Judicial 
Council has acquired constitutional status. 
The Supreme Court and the District Court are the only 
Courts of this State which are created by the Constitution. The 
Circuit Court was created by an act of the Legislature. It is 
inconceivable that the Legislature which has the power to create 
or abolish the Circuit Court would not have power to provide for 
its supervision. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
DECLARATORY OR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF. 
Defendants' position apparently fails to recognize that 
the District Court's jurisdiction was invoked under four separate 
and distinct causes of action and relief was sought in the nature 
of certiorari, prohibition, and declaratory judgment. Inasmuch 
as the arguments relating to the availability of relief vary from 
one cause of action to another, Plaintiffs will treat them 
separately herein. 
In their First Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs asked that 
the District Court require the Circuit Court to certify its 
files, records and transcripts concerning the subject criminal 
proceedings and asked that the District Court issue its writ 
8 
requiring Defendants tc discharge Plaintiffs from liability under 
the subject undertakings. In their Second Claim for Relief, 
Plaintiffs requested declaratory judgment, asking the District 
Court to "construe and interpret Utah law with respect to the 
duties and obligations of the Plaintiffs under the facts and 
circumstances as set forth in the above-mentioned criminal 
proceedings and in similar proceedings." In their Third Claim 
for Relief, Plaintiffs asked that the District Court issue its 
order enjoining the Defendants from in any way retaliating 
against the Plaintiffs, including an order enjoining any 
unjustified interference with Plaintiffs' bonding authority. 
Finally, in the Fourth Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs asked that 
the District Court exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over 
Defendants and issue all orders and writs necessary in support 
thereof "requiring Defendants to accept the Plaintiffs 
undertaking barring some articulable and a justifiable reason for 
refusing to honor the same." 
Relief was granted in the following particulars: 
1. The District Court prohibited the enforcement of 
the Circuit Court's directive terminating Plaintiffs1 bonding 
authority "unless and until Plaintiffs are provided with notice 
of the basis of any suspension or revocation of their bonding 
authority and given opportunity for a full hearing on the issues 
of their qualification and fitness to act as bondmen in the Ninth 
Circuit Court." 
2. By way of declaratory relief, the District Court 
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determined that the subiect undertakings of bail nad been 
exonerated. 
3* Finally the District Court exercised its 
supervisory jurisdiction and articulated the nature and extent of 
a bondsman's obligation in a criminal case. 
A 
AN ORDER OR WRIT IN THE NATURE OF PROHIBITION 
IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY. 
In State ex rel. Weaver v. Dostertf W. Va.f 300 S.E.2d 
102 (1983), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found a 
Writ of Prohibition to be an appropriate remedy for staying a 
lower court's order revoking bonding authority until the bondsman 
was provided notice and a hearing. 
B 
THE DISTRICT COURT APPROPRIATELY GRANTED 
DECLARATORY RELIEF. 
Defendants are determined to overlook the declaratory 
aspects of the District Court Judgment and to attack the entire 
Judgment on the basis of the unavailability of extraordinary 
relief. 
U.C.A. 78-33-1 provides as follows: 
The district courts within their respective 
jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, 
status, and other legal relations, whether or not 
further relief is or could be claimed. No action or 
proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground 
that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. 
The declaration may be either affirmative or negative 
in form and effect; and such declaration shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
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The District Court had power to "declare rights, 
status, and other legal relationships" relating to the nature and 
extent of the Plaintiffs1 obligations on subject undertakings of 
bail. 
Declaratory relief is not confined to cases where no 
other relief was or could be granted. Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 
339, 135 P.2d 251 (1943); Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 
154 P.2d 748 (1944). Indeed, the Declaratory Judgment Act is 
remedial in nature and "its purpose is to settle and to afford 
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, 
status, and other legal relations; and is to be liberally 
construed and administered." U.C.A. 78-33-12. 
C 
NO APPEAL WAS AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFFS NOR WAS 
ANY SUCH RIGHT WAIVED. 
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs could have appealed 
the Circuit Court's ruling and that having failed to do so are 
not entitled to seek declaratory or extraordinary relief in 
determining their liability on outstanding undertakings of bail. 
Contrary "to this assertion, there exists no final judgment from 
which Plaintiffs could have perfected an appeal. 
Whenever a minute entry is made indicating that a 
criminal defendant failed to appear as required, that minute 
entry "is deemed a forfeiture of the bail which has been posted." 
U.C.A. 77-20a-l. No action can be initiated for the purpose of 
taking judgment against a surety until sixty (60) days have 
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elapsed from the date of the forfeiture. U.C.A. 77-20a-2. 
Defendants have not initiated any proceeding against Plaintiffs 
or obtained any final judgment against them as sureties on the 
subject undertakings. 
After the Defendants had indicated their intention to 
enforce undertakings given on behalf of persons who had failed to 
meet some condition of their probation, Plaintiffs initiated this 
action in the District Court in an attempt to have their rights 
and liabilities adjudicated prior to the initiation of a 
multitude of actions in the Circuit Court to take judgment 
against Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs have no right of appeal under the rule 
announced in People v. Tremayne, 3 Utah 331, 3 P. 85 (1884). 
Defendants take the position that Tremayne no longer has any 
application as a result of the many changes in the bail and court 
structure which have occurred since that case was decided. 
On page 6 of their Brief, Defendants state: "Moreover, 
this Court has entertained an appeal from a circuit court bail 
forfeiture order which had been appealed to the district court." 
Defendants cite Walton v. Circuit Court, Utah, Case No. 16281 
(Filed December 12, 1979) -and go on to say: "Appealability of a 
bond forfeiture order was not an issue, but the case was 
successfully appealed to the district court and the district 
court order was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court." A photocopy 
of the Third District Court pleadings in Walton (Verified 
Complaint and Petition for Issuance of Certiorari and the Summary 
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Judgment) are attached hereto and designated as Addendum "A" and 
"B", Contrary to Defendants1 conclusions, the bail forfeitures 
in Walton were not appealed to the District Court from the 
Circuit Court. A complaint for declaratory judgment and a 
petition for extraordinary relief was filed with the District 
Court. 
A review of these pleadings in Walton will reveal that 
the pleadings filed and the theories relied upon therein are 
virtually identical to the course followed by Plaintiffs in the 
instant action. 
Plaintiffs act as surety on at least ten individual 
undertakings of bail which Defendants have refused to exonerate. 
If Plaintiffs' only remedy is to wait until the Circuit Court has 
proceeded to judgment on each undertaking and appeal each 
individual case to the District Court, the remedy can hardly be 
deemed adequate. 
POINT III 
JUDGE OWENS HAS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION TO SUPERVISE 
BONDSMEN IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT BUT THE REVOCATION 
OF PLAINTIFFS1 BONDING AUTHORITY WAS IMPROPER. 
It has been held that the deprivation, by revocation of 
a license previously grantedf of the right to engage in the bail 
bond business is a judicial act that must meet the requirements 
of due process of law. In Re Carterf 192 F.2d 15 (1951); Weaver 
v. Dosterty supra. 
In Carter, supra, the United States Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia, was considering the appropriateness of the 
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Federal District Court's action in denying a bondsman's 
application to do business with the Court and referring tc an 
earlier opinion involving the same bondsman stated the following: 
On appeal we held the revocation invalid for lack of "a 
hearing and revelation of all data upon which a 
decision is to be based." We held that whatever might 
be true of the grant of the right to engage in the 
bonding business, and "the deprivation of that right, 
once granted, is a judicial act, requiring due process 
of law." 192 F.2d, p.16. 
The Federal District Court had taken the position that 
Carter's application was "in the administrative discretion of the 
Court". The Court of Appeals likened the application of a 
bondsman to that of an attorney applying to practice before a 
court and observed: 
But both lawyers and bondsman are on quite different 
footing from a Court's Clerk or Bailiff. They are not 
completely under the Court's control, or obligated to 
deal with the public impartially; within wide limits 
they may chose how, when, where and whom they will 
serve. They are not commonly paid from public funds, 
their callings are not necessarily limited to a single 
person or a few persons, they cannot be deprived of 
their functions in a Court's discretion. 192 F.2d, pp. 
16-17. 
The Court of Appeals went on to state: 
Old charges never brought to trial, and appellant's 
innocent mistake of fact on an immaterial matter, do 
not support the [revocation] order. Nor do any secret 
charges that may have been made by anonymous informants 
whom the appellant had no opportunity to confront and 
cross examine. 192 F.2df p. 17. 
The Court of Appeals concluded: 
We do not imply that in our opinion the appealed order 
would be valid if it were administrative. Like the 
order involved in Carter's previous appeal, if it were 
upheld, it would destroy an established business. We 
do not imply that in our opinion a purely adminis-
trative refusal to renew, or to grant, a license to do 
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a lawful ousines? could be supported if based on 
arbitrary grounds or made without such a "hearing and 
opportunity to answer . . . as would constitute due 
process." 192 F.2d, p. 17. 
The Judgment appealed from in the instant case merely 
prohibits the enforcement of any order or directive suspending or 
evoking Plaintiff bonding authority unless Plaintiffs are first 
provided with notice of the basis of any suspension or revocation 
and given opportunity for full hearing on the issues of their 
qualification and fitness. 
Defendants have cited Taylor v. Waddey, 206 Tenn. 497, 
334 S.W.2d 733 (1960). The factual background in Waddey, supra, 
is briefly stated as follows: 
On May 13, 1959, one of the General Sessions Judges had 
notice served by the Sheriff on the appellee bondsman 
and bonding company to appear at a fixed place in the 
courthouse of Davidson County on May 20th at a fixed 
time "and then and there show cause why the order of 
November 12, 1958, approving the Petition" etc. of the 
bonding company and its power of attorney, should not 
be revoked and canceled. On May 25th after the 
hearing, pursuant to this Notice, the five Judges of 
the General Sessions Courts of Davidson County entered 
an order which among other things shows that "after the 
unanimous decision of the five Judges of the General 
Sessions Courts sitting en banke that the said Robert 
Waddey oe permanently suspended from the writing of 
bonds in The General Sessions Court and it is, 
therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that said 
Robert Waddey is from and after Friday, May 22, 1959, 
permanently suspended from the writing of bonds in the 
General Sessions Court, and further that the show cause 
order in respect to The Athens Bonding Company be and 
the same is indefinitely taken under advisement." 334 
S.W.2d, p. 734. 
Defendants apparently cite this case for the 
proposition that a Court has inherent power to regulate the 
bonding business and that the power extends to more than an 
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examination of financial responsibility out includes also moral 
qualification. With this premise Plaintiffs heartily agree. 
Plaintiffs cite the case to provide the Court with a comparison 
of the method by which the bonding authority was terminated in 
that case as opposed to the method by which Plaintiffs1 bonding 
authority was terminated in the instance case. 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee went on to state: 
So long as the bondsman complies with the statutes 
above referred to and meets a fair and reasonable 
standard in the conduct of his business before these 
courts, then there is no one going to prevent him from 
practicing his profession therein. 334 S.W.2d, p. 737. 
Defendants quote the same language from Taylor v. 
Waddey, supra, suggesting that Plaintiffs have somehow failed ro 
meet "a fair and reasonable standard in the conduct of [their] 
business" before the Ninth Circuit Court. Plaintiffs challenge 
Defendants to articulate one incident of misconduct supported by 
the record of the District Court. 
Plaintiffs agree that Judge Owens has authority and 
discretion to supervise them in the conduct of their bonding 
business before his court. Plaintiffs merely asked the District 
Court to determine the legality of the Circuit Court's policy 
regarding the nature and extent of their obligation on certain 
bail bonds. The Circuit Court responded by arbitrarily 
terminating their bonding authority without notice and without 
hearing. Plaintiffs fail to see that any discretion was 
exercised and if such conduct constitutes the exercise of 
discretion, it is an abuse thereof. 
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POINT IV 
THE SUBJECT UNDERTAKINGS OF BAIL HAVE BEEN 
EXONERATED BY OPERATION OF LAW. 
U.C.A. 1953 Section 77-20-7(1) provides as follows: 
The principal and the sureties on the written 
undertaking are liable thereon during all proceedings 
and for all appearances required of the defendant up to 
and including the surrender of the defendant in 
execution of any sentence imposed irrespective of any 
contrary provision in the undertaking. [Emphasis Added] 
U.C.A. 77-20-8 provides pertinent part: 
Upon convictionf by plea or trial, the court may order 
a defendant to be taken into custody or may order bail 
continued pending imposition of sentenced [Emphasis 
added.] 
The two sections are harmonized when read in 
conjunction with U.C.A. 77-18-1 which reads in pertinent part as 
follows: 
On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any 
crime of offense, except in the case of class C 
misdemeanors, for which supervised probation by the 
Department of Corrections may not be imposed, and if it 
appears compatible with the public interest, the court 
may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and 
place the defendant on probation for a period of time 
it may determine, unless otherwise provided by law. 
The legal custody of all probationers referred to the 
Department of Corrections is vested in the court having 
jurisdiction and the Department of Correction. The 
legal custody of all unsupervised probationers is 
vested in the court having jurisdiction of the 
offender"! [Emphasis added.] 
The Circuit Court takes the position that an 
undertaking remains in force and effect after sentence is imposed 
and until such time as the conditions of probation, if granted, 
are met. 
A bail bond serves a three-fold purpose: (1) it 
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permits release of a defendant from incarceration; (2) it 
delivers the custody of the defendant to the bail bondsman; and 
(3) it guarantees the personal appearance of the defendant for 
trial and for imposition of sentence. 
Benally, Marshall and Ashcroft appeared for the 
imposition of sentence. They were all granted probation as a 
condition of which they were to each to serve two days in the 
Washington County Jail. Each of these defendants surrendered 
themselves to the custody of the Sheriff of Washington County and 
upon completion of this imprisonment they left the jail pursuant 
to the order of probation, not by reason of the undertakings of 
bail. It cannot be said that they were still on bail while 
committed to jail. Commitment to jail terminates the obligation 
of bail. U.C.A. 77-20-8(2). 
By the order of probation, each of these defendants was 
committed to the legal custody of the Circuit Court. Each of 
these three defendants surrendered themselves to the actual 
custody of the Washington County Sheriff. 
Greening, on the other hand, while not submitting 
himself to the physical custody of the Sheriff of Washington 
County was, as a probationer, from and after the entry of the 
order of probation, in the legal custody of the Circuit Court 
rather than in the custody of his bail bondsman. U.C.A. 77-18-1. 
An interesting anomaly arises when U.C.A. 77-20-8(2) is 
applied to the Circuit Court's policy. Under that section, a 
bail bondsman is entitled to effect the surrender of a defendant 
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for whom he has bonded by delivering a certified copy of the 
undertaking to a peace officer who then detains the defendant in 
his custody "as upon a commitment." 
In commenting upon this anomalyf a California Court of 
Appeals in People v. Doey 172 Cal. App.2d 812, 342 P.2d 533 
(1959) stated: 
But if the court has granted the defendant probation, 
the power to surrender the defendant not only would 
defeat the purpose of probation, but would impair its 
operation, as both the court and the sureties would 
have the control of the defendant. 
* * * 
If bond were still in effect after a probation order 
was made which did not impose incarceration as a term 
thereof, a surrender of the defendant to the jailer by 
the bondsman would be an idle act; because the jailer 
would then have no authority to imprison the defendant, 
she being free on the terms of the probation order. 
An order granting probation without imposing 
incarceration as a term thereof, frees from jail a 
defendant who has been unable to post bail. It is 
inconsistent that a defendant, who is on bail, should 
be in a less favorable position than such a prisoner, 
or that he should continue in the technical custody of 
his bondsman. 
In Rodman v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.2d 262, 89 
P.2d 109, the court held that when a defendant appears 
at the "time for pronouncement of judgment" under Pen. 
Code sec. 1191 (which is also the time for hearing of 
an application for probation), the surety is entitled 
to be exonerated upon application. This is 
inconsistent with the theory that if at the time of 
such appearance and hearing, the defendant is granted 
probation, the bail bond still continues in a state of 
suspended animation, to be revived if ever probation is 
revoked. 342 P.2d, p. 537. 
See also Trammel v. State, Tex. Crim., S.W.2d 528 
(1975). 
Plaintiffs submit that the Circuit Court1s policy is in 
direct contradiction to the statutory directives of the Utah Code 
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and that from and after the imposition of sentence, the criminal 
defendants, and each of them, were in the custody of the Circuit 
Court and no longer in the custody of the Plaintiffs or in any 
way subject to the Plaintiffs' control. 
A criminal defendant cannot be compelled, at the price 
of his liberty, between the date of his arrest and the close of 
his trial, to give a bond guaranteeing the performance of a 
sentence which the law presumes will never be imposed upon him as 
an innocent man. He can only be required, at the outset of any 
prosecution, to give a bond guaranteeing his appearance through 
all stages of a criminal proceedings until such time as the court 
acquires custody of his person upon judgment of conviction. 
Finally, Plaintiffs briefly addressed the allegation 
that Plaintiffs entered into an oral agreement with the Circuit 
Court expanding the terms and conditions of the subject 
undertakings. In their brief, Defendants state that ,f[t]he 
language of the individual bonds provides that the terms would 
continue through execution of sentence." Defendants then support 
the statement by referring, not to the written undertakings but, 
to a letter from Judge Owens to the Sheriff of Washington County 
and an Affidavit filed by the Judge following the District 
Court's ruling (R. 61, 107). Plaintiffs have attached all of the 
subject undertakings of bail as addendum hereto for the purpose 
of demonstrating that the written undertakings contain no such 
language. (Addendum C, D, E and F.) 
Plaintiffs categorically deny any such oral expansion 
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of their obligations under the subject undertakings. 
Furthermore, Defendants' argument is without merit for the 
following reasons: (1) Defendants failed to properly raise the 
issue in the District Court; (2) any such attempt to orally 
expand Plaintiffs' obligations would be unenforceable under the 
statute of frauds and evidence of any such attempted expansion 
would be inadmissible under the parol evidence rule; and (3) the 
applicable statutes define the nature and extent of the sureties 
obligations and the statute governs "irrespective of any contrary 
provision in the undertaking." U.C.A. 77-20-7. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the District Court 
acted appropriately in granting declaratory relief and 
adjudicating disputed rights and obligations existing between the 
parties. The court ruled without any objection being made by 
Defendants regardina the availability of declaratory relief. 
Indeed, such an araument would have been without merit. 
The District Court further acted appropriately in 
granting extraordinary relief to the extent that such relief was 
appropriate in enjoining the enforcement of the Circuit Court's 
directive which had deprived Plaintiffs of their bonding 
authority without notice or hearing. 
Finally, Plaintiffs submit that the District Court's 
ruling concerning the duration and exoneration of the subject 
undertakings of bail is the only interpretation which harmonizes 
all of the relevant statutory law and is in harmony with 
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traditional principles of criminal and constitutional law. 
The District Court should be affirmed in all respects, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / $~ day of May, 1986. 
/s / ^ . 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on this /$"" day of May, 1986, 
I did personally mail a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Brief of Respondents to David L. Wilkinson, Attorney 
General, Diane W. Wilkins, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Secretary 
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Konald C. barker \ - ^^>*>-«-/ j . er^j^v/^ (?.. -^
 iW . . 
Attorney fc: nlainTllfs ' '"J . T."."/; f t'"^ •' 
2870 South State Street " ''"A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 4/ 
Telephone: 486-9636 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
VINCENT P. WALTON, as ) 
general partner of BEEHIVE 
BAIL BONDS, a limited part- ) 
nership, and LEO G. BATEMAN 
and GLADYS M. BATEMAN, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF ) PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF 
UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, CERTIORARI 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, ) *?& trprftw 
and the HONORABLE MAURICE Civil No. C 78-__2_L____^ 
D. JONES, Circuit Judge, ) 
Defendants. ) 
00O00 
Plaintiffs complain and allege against the defen-
dants as follows: 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
1. The plaintiff Behive Bail Bonds is a limited 
partnership organized and existing under the Laws of the 
State of Utah, with Vincent P. Walton as the sole general 
partner. The plaintiffs Leo G. Bateman and Gladys M. Bate-
man, hereinafter referred to as "Batemans," are husband and 
wife, and are the persons who, for and on behalf of Beehive 
Bail Bonds executed and filed the undertakings in bail which 
are the subject matter of this lawsuit, and whose bail bonds 
the defendatns have ordered forfeited. The plaintiff Leo G. 
Bateman is the sole limited partner in Beehive Bail Bonds. 
2. That the defendant Circuit Court is a duly 
organized and existing Court of the State of Utah, as pro-
vided by 78-4-1, UCA, 1953, et seq., and the defendant Jones 
is a judge of said Court. 
3. The District Court has supervisory control 
over the Circuit Court as provided by 78-3-**. UCA, 1953, 
Art. VIII, £ 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
Rule 65B, URCP, including the power to issue writs of man-
damus, injunction, certiorari, prohibition, and other writs 
necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments and 
decrees, and to give them a general control over inferior 
courts and tribunals, including the defendants in this 
matter. This is an appropriate case for the exercise of 
that power to control the acts of the defendants herein, it 
appearing that plaintiff herein has no standing to appeal 
the orders forfeiting the bail or denying the motions to 
exonerate the bail bonds since the bail bondsmen are not 
parties to the criminal proceedings in the Salt Lake City 
Court. See People v. Tremayne, 3 U. 331, 3 P. 85. 
4. That plaintiffs filed undertakings of bail 
with the City Court of Salt Lake City, in the following 
cases, copies of which are annexed hereto as exhibits "A", 
"B", "C" and "D". In each instance a fine was imposed upon 
the defendant which the defendant in each of those cases has 
failed to pay: 
#A0130669 - Donald J. Cromer 
0AO253135 - George Tovar 
#A0253135 - David George Crenshaw, aka David 
Gregory 
0AO271648 - Michael Rulin Hedelius 
5. In each of the above-mentioned cases the 
Honorable Maurice D. Jones, Judge of the Circuit Court 
(which has taken over the functions of the Salt Lake City 
Court) has ordered the undertaking in bail filed by plain-
tiffs herein forfeited by reason of non-payment of said 
fines by the defendants in the cases listed in 1 3 above, 
and has denied plaintiffs* herein motion to exonerate said 
bonds. A copy of the orders denying said motions is annexed 
hereto as exhibits "E'\ "F", "G" and "H". 
6. Under the terms of said undertakings, exhibits 
"A" thru "D", the obligation of plaintiff herein is limited 
to (u) assuring the appearance of the defendants in those 
cases before the lower court to answer trie charge, to (b) 
assure that said defendants would at all times hold (or 
surrender) themselves amenable to the orders and process of 
the court, (c) and if convicted, that they would appear for 
judgment and (d) render themselves in execution thereof. 
There is no agreement in said exhibits "A" thru nD" that the 
bail bondsman would pay any fine which might be imposed by 
the Court. 
7. Under the terms of applicable laws and stat-
utes, including but not limited to the provisions of 77-33-
13, 77-35-4, 77-43-22, 77-43-23, 77-43-24, 77-43-25, UCA, 
1953, the liability and obligation of plaintiffs herein b> 
reason of said bail bonds, exhibits "A" thru "D", termi-
nated, was extinguished and liability under those bail bonds 
was exonerated at the time that the Court imposed sentence 
upon those defendants. 
8. The order of the Circuit Court (and City 
Court) forfeiting the bail bonds and denying the motion to 
exonerate the bonds was and is void, contrary to law, and 
should be vacated and set aside, and the defendants should 
be ordered and directed to do so. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
9. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference 
thereto all of the allegations contained in the first claim 
for relief above. 
10. This action is a suit for declaratory judg-
ment as provided by Title 78, Chapter 33, UCA, 1953, and 
other applicable laws. The defendants are all of the par-
ties required to be made parties to this action as provided 
by 78-33-11, UCA, 1953. 
11. The Court should declare, as provided by 78-
33-2, UCA, 1953, the rights, status, obligations and legal 
relations between the plaintiffs and defendants with respect 
to the obligation, if any of a bail bondsman to pay a fine 
-3-
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imposed by the Court after a finding of guilt or plea of 
guilt has Deen entered. 
12. Under the provisions of the statutes and laws 
mentioned in H 7 above, including 77-33-13, 77-43-23, 77-43-
24, 77-33-25, UCA, 1953, surrender of the person on whose 
behalf the undertaking in bail was filed exonorates the bail 
bond, regardless of the disposition of the charges pending 
against that person, and whther or not he pays any fine that 
may be imposed by the Court in that proceeding. The Hon-
orable Maurice D. Jones has ruled that surrender of the 
person for whom the undertaking was filed does not exonoratc 
the undertaking in bail, and that the bail bondsman remains 
liable thereunder to guarantee payment of any fine that is 
imposed, and the performance of any other conditions imposed 
by the Court order, which would presumably include perfor-
mance of conditions of probation, etc. 
13. It is in the interests of orderly administra-
tion of justice and the rights of the parties, that the 
Court construe and interpret whether or not surrender of the 
person for whom an undertaking in bail has been filed by a 
bail bondsman exonorates and discharges that bond, and if 
not, what duties and obligations the bail bondsman has after 
the surrender of the person for whom the undertaking in bail 
was filed. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
14. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference 
thereto and re-allege all of the allegations in the first 
and second claims for relief, above. 
15. The Court should construe and interpret 
whether or not a finding of guilt or a plea of guilty by the 
person for whom the undertaking in bail has been filed 
accompanied by his appearance before the Court, exonorates 
the undertaking in bail. In the alternative, the Court 
should declare whether or not the imposition of sentence by 
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the Court after a findirtf of guilt or plea of guilty by the 
person for whom an undertaking in bail has been filed, 
accompanied by his appearance before the Court, exonorates 
the undertaking in bail. It is the position of plaintiffs 
that eitner of said acts (finding or plea of guilty or 
imposition of sentence, together with his appearance before 
the Court) discharges the bail bondsman and exonorates the 
undertaking in bail. Among other things, the person is then 
in the custody of the Court and the bail bondsman has no 
further rights or duties concerning him. See also statutes 
mentioned in \} 6 and 12 above. It is the position of the 
defendants that saic acts or events do not discharge the 
bail bondsman fror liability or exonerate the undertaking in 
bail. See first claim for relief above, and exhibits "E" 
thru "11 attached hereto. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
16. Plaintiffs incorporate herein bv reference 
thereto all of the allegations in the first, second and 
third claims for relief, above. 
17. The Court should declare, construe and inter-
pret the circumstance'-, terms and conditions upon and/or 
under which a b^il Doaasman can be and/or is relieved of 
further liability, duties or responsibilities on his under-
taking in bail, and tne acts or things which he is required 
to do and/or whicti must occur to terminate his liability and 
obligations. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against 
the defendants and/or declaring, interpreting and construing 
the rights, duties and obligations of the parties and of 
bail bondsmen under Utah Law, under the usual form of under-
taking on bail in use in Utah (see exhibits "A" thru "D" 
attached), as follows: 
18. For the issuance of a writ of certiorari 
directing the defendants to certify to the District Court 
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tneir entire- files, recorcs anc transcript concerning the 
cases listed in \ a above, including tne proceedings and 
orders pertaining to proceedings for forfeiture of tne 
undertakings on bail of the plaintiff herein in those cases, 
and orders entered in connection therewith. 
19. On the first claim for relief for a writ of 
mandate requiring the defendants to discharge the plaintiffs 
herein from liability under, and to exonorate the under-
takings in bail filed by plaintiffs herein on behalf of the 
persons accused in the cases listed in K 4 above, and for a 
writ of prohibition prohibiting the defendants from forfeit-
ing the undertaking on bail in said cases, from taking or 
permitting the taking or prosecuting of any proceedings to 
require the payment of any amounts by plaintiffs herein by 
reason of and/or as a result of the filing of the undertak-
ings in bail filed in said cases by the plaintiff herein, 
including prohibiting the defendants from causing the removal 
of plaintiffs' signs offering bail bonding service from the 
jail or other public places, or from otherwise interfering 
with the conduct by plaintiffs herein of their bail bonding 
business bv reason of and/or as a result of this lawsuit 01 
the undertakings in bail filed in connection with those 
matters, or the failure of plaintiffs herein to pay the 
amount of the bail forfeiture in those cases. 
20. On the second claim for relief for declara-
tory judgment construing and interpreting Utah Law with 
respect to the duties and obligations of bail bondsmen after 
surrender of the accused to the jail, police or other appro-
priate public official, and determining that upon such an 
occurance the undertaking in bail is exonorated and that the 
bail bondsman is thereupon discharged from further liability 
or obligation by reason of that undertaking. 
21. On the third claim for relief for declaratory 
judgment construing and interpreting Utah Law with respect 
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t the duties and ooiigations " f tail bondspe:, aftci a 
finding of guilt, and after imposition of sentence, adjudg-
ing that upon such an occurrence the undertaking in bail is 
exonorated and that the bail bondsman is thereupon dis-
charged from further liability or obligations by reason of 
that undertaking. 
22. On the fourth claim for relief for declara-
tory judgment construing and interpreting Utah Law to declare 
the circumstances, terms and conditions upon and/or under 
which a bail bondsman can be and/or is relieved from further 
liability, duties or responsibilities on his undertaking in 
bail, and the acts or things which he is required to do 
and/or which must occur to terminate his liability anc 
obligations. 
23. For such other and further relief as the 
Court deems proper in trie circumstances. 
Dated this 2i day of August, 1978. 
Ronald C. Barker, attorney lor 
plaintiffs 
STATE OF UIAH ) 
: SS . 
County of Salt Lake) 
LLO G. BATEMAN, GLADYS M. BATEMAN and VINCE WAL-
TON, being each first duly sworn, each on his oath deposes 
and says that he is a plaintiff in the above-entitled mat-
ter; that he has read the foregoing complaint and petition 
for writ of certiorari and is familiar with the statemetns 
of fact contained therein; that each of said statemetns is 
true of his own knowledge except for statements made on 
information and belief and as to each such statement he 
believes it to be true; that just cause exists for the 
prosecution of this matter, for the issuance of a writ of 
certiorari, and for declaratory judgment defining the rights, 
duties and obligations of bail bondsmen; that different 
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juages cf tr.e Circuit Court, Salt LaKe Cit\ Department, 
construe the rights, duties and obligations of bail bondsmen 
in an manner substantially different from the manner in 
which they are construed by the Honorable Maurice D. Jones, 
that it is in the interests of justice and orderly judicial 
proceedings that the rights, duties and obligations of bail 
bondsmen be defined by this Court. 
Dated this J? day of August, 1978. 
/ ( 7 
Leo G. Bateman 
\!Lf letJ ' r if ' 7 
Gladys M.,/ Bateman 
/t^^f^— U ,?,r. i~> 
Vince Walton 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this K day 
of August, 1978. 
s 
Notary Public residing at Salt Lake 
City /Utah 
My commission expires: 7^nt'\ l£ \ i / /' ,•-
Plaintiffs' addresses: 
1146 Ea^ 2700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
3249 South West Temple jzay boutn west Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
-8-
Ov 
honalc v, barRcr ^ f '.r\v*4sKs\ j ,.\,.*\/ 
Attornev n>r plaintiffs \ " '*'4* 
2870 Soutt State Street 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 8411:-
Telephone: 486-963e 
IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC1 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
VINCENT P. WALTON, et al.f ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF ) 
UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, and ) 
the HONORABLE MAURICE D. Civil No. C 78-5004 
JONES, Circuit Judge, ) 
Defendants. ) 
ooOoo 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in the 
above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing at the 
hour of 10:00 a.m. on the 31st day of October, 1978, before 
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, District Judge. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Ronald C. Barker and defendants were 
represented by Robert R. Wallace, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral. Oral arguments were presented by respective counsel. 
It appearing to the Court that the undertakings in bail 
filed with the defendants do not constitute an undertaking 
that the defendant on whose behalf the undertaking was iiled 
will pay a fine that may be assessed against that person by 
the defendants and that the obligation of plaintiff under 
the terms of that bail bond and applicable law is limited to 
the obligations to produce the defendant at appropriate 
times and places up to and including the time of sentenc-
ing, but not thereafter. The Court being fully advised in 
the premises and good cause appearing therefor, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The defendants are ordered to exonerate the 
undertakings in bail filed by plaintiff and to discharge and 
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release the plaintiffs fron liability under tne follower:*. 
bail bonds filed by plaintiffs with defendants. 
Case IA0130669 - Donald J. Cromer 
Case IA0253135 - George Tovar 
Case #A0253135 - David George Crenshaw, aka David 
Gregory 
Case IA0271648 - Michael Rulin Hedelius 
Defendants are restrained, enjoined and prohibited frorr 
forfeiting the bail posted by plaintiff in those cases; irom 
in any manner taking or prosecuting any proceedings to 
require payment of any amounts by reason of non-payment by 
the defendants in those cases of their fines imposed by the 
defendants; from causing the removal of plaintiffs' signs 
ottering their bail bonding service trom the jail or other 
puolic places, or from otnerwise interrenng wirn tr.e con-
duct by plaintiffs of their bail bonding business DV reason 
of non-payment of said fines and the failure of plamtir: 
herein to pav said fines on behalf of the defendants in 
tnose cases. 
2. The Court determines that the obligation of 
tne bail bonasman is fulfilled by the producing the oerson 
tor whom the bail was posted at the times and places reauirec 
by the Court up to and including the time of sentencing, anc 
that under tne provisions or 77-33-13, UCA, 1955, anc otner 
applicable laws, that the bail bond is exonoratea upon entry 
of a plea by the person for whom the bond is furnished, 
unless the bail bondsman agrees that the bond may continue 
thereafter. _^^ 
~VJN 
Dated the <&*! day of November, 1978. BY THE COURT: 
4 w t ATTEST » 
K W-ST£'flLpG EVANS 
^ ^ ^ ^ District Judge 
s&At 
*1<X 
WASHINGTON COUNTY** ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
u I U O 






for*/P.* r - V y ^ > i> r. * / / / t?< . ^ j / 
/ ,' Defendant(s)~)Y 
(include address and DOB) ) 
UNDERTAKING 
An order was made on the date of A/QU '-?,/¥&/ hy the above court, 
that the defendant be held to answer upon a charge of fj
 :T ( j -( 
Bail was set in the amount of $ ^>'-> ^ * 
We, the undersigned H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER, of 
Logan, Utah, Cache County, State of Utah, jointly and severally undertake that 
the defendant £ c»; (e&y U^ ' <'<£ hj g i^j't*m/ will appear and answer the charge 
mentioned above ta whatever court it may be presented, and that he will at all 
times hold himself amenable to the orders and proceedings of the court, including 
all appearances required of him by the court up to and including his surrender in 
execution of any sentence irrespective of any contrary provision contained herein, 
or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that he will pay to the plantiff 
the sum of $ 5 ^ <T^ ' ^ ' ? anc* if the defendant does not make payment after 
the forfeiture of the bond, judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff and 
against us as sureties for the amount set forth. 
We hereby submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably 
appoint the clerk of the court as our agent upon whom any papers affecting our 
liability on this undertaking may be served, and that our liability may be inforced 
on motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of 
an independent action. 
iESWijrR 
AFFIDAVIT 





Sureties* names and addresses: 
H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER 
746 North 100 West Logan, Utah 84321 
The sureties whose names are subscribed to the above undertaking, being sworn, 
each for himself, says: that he is a real or personal property holder within the 
State of Utah, and is worth the sum in the undertaking specified as the penalty 
thereof, over and above all his just debts and liabilities, exclusive of property 
exempt from execution. 
Surety Surety 
H.C. HENINGER DORIS W. HENINGER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date of 
~ - \ Notary Public y 
<Seal> Residing * A , ; : \\.\: U U U 1, 
JJ^ / Y -
My commission expires ' ^ i~ ti\ / * ^ 
The above undertaking is hereby accepted, and the sureties are approved. 
Dated 
Circuit Judie 




(include address and DOB) 






An order was made on the date of Oio^ &- ,/frss" by the above court, 
that the defendant be held to answer upon a charge of OUT A/o- //xi**'s 
r 
L ic*t*i>? Bail was set in the amount of $ £/& &° 
We, the undersigned H.C HEN1NGER and DORIS W. HENINGER, of 
Logan, Utah, Cache County, State of Utah, jointly and severally undertake that 
the defendant 5<*^ug ( SefifllL, will appear and answer the charge 
mentioned above in whatever court it may be presented, and that he will at all 
times hold himself amenable to the orders and proceedings of the court, including 
all appearances required of him by the court up to and including his surrender in 
jexecution of any sentence irrespective of any contrary provision contained herein, 
or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that he will pay to the plantiff 
the sum of $ /^/^/^° ; and if the defendant does not make payment after 
the forfeiture of the bond, judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff and 
against us as sureties for the amount set forth. 
We hereby submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably 
appoint the clerk of the court as our agent upon whom any papers affecting our 
liability on this undertaking may be served, and that our liability may be inforced 
on motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of 
an independent action. 
• -.:'• . M ' •'' /• ]L 
Surety Surety 
H.C. HENINGER DORIS W. HENINGER 
AFFIDAVIT 





Sureties' names and addresses: 
H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER 
746 North 100 West Logan, Utah 84321 
The sureties whose names are subscribed to the above undertaking, being sworn, 
each for himself, says: that he is a real or personal property holder within the 
State of Utah, and is worth the sum in the undertaking specified as the penalty 
thereof, over and above all his just debts and liabilities, exclusive of property 
exempt from execution. 
o 
Surety 
H.C. HENINGER DORIS W. HENINGER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date of 
£~ \ Notary Public \ V £ _ J ) 
My commission expires 
The above undertaking is hereby accepted, and the sureties are approved. 
Dated 
Circuit Judge 
WASHINGTON COUNTY" ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
\\\z- v*: 
y c f v 7\CKi vr-r -: 
-•J C:e/fe cf th: ^ 
-irlraani, Stete o. t: *, 
''. uoume..U\ ** • ''i - -^"r " 
WITNESS) my Kar^  ano LO J of 
r^ t^ N Pa-ag-tt:.... 
Plaintiff ) 
^ I Li l" ipm£_ 





! Defendant(s) ) 0 5^"TF'u:)J 
(include address and DOB) 
UNDERTAKING 
An order was made on the date of ^cx«~ ;& / y ^ < ^ hy the above court, 
that the defendant be held to answer upon a charge of TJ, (A 4 
. Bail was^et in the a amou »pt6tj[: «s:s5 ^ . t > ^ 
We, the undersigned H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER, of 
Logan, Utah, Cache County, State of Utah, jointly and severally undertake that 
the defendant vV*Phn^ ArouU*, ^SJBL will appear and answer the charge 
mentioned above in wnatever court it may be presented, and that he will at all 
times hold himself amenable to the orders and proceedings of the court, including 
all appearances required of him by the court up to and including his surrender in 
execution of any sentence irrespective of any contrary provision contained herein, 
or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that he will pay to the plantiff 
the sum of $_SJSJSL!^£ ; and if the defendant does not make payment after 
the forfeiture of the bond, judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff and 
against us as sureties for the amount set forth. 
We hereby submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably 
appoint the clerk of the court as our agent upon whom any papers affecting our 
liability on this undertaking may be served, and that our liability may be inforced 
on motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of 
an independent action. 
\J Surety 
H.C. HENINGER DORIS W. HENINGER 
AFFIDAVIT 





Sureties' names and addresses: 
H.C HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER 
746 North 100 West Logan, Utah 84321 
The sureties whose names are subscribed to the above undertaking, being sworn, 
each for himself, says: that he is a real or personal properly holder within the 
State of Utah, and is worth the sum in the undertaking specified as the penalty 
thereof, over and above all his just debts and liabilities, exclusive of property 
exempt from execution. 
)*JL 
lu r«V \ ^ _ _ _ _ ^ X ^ \ Suren 
B.C. HENINGER DORIS W. HENINGER 
^3=u, w 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date of 
\ LWAXY (\x 
(Seal) 
My commission expires ^2_ 
The above undertaking is hereby accepted, and the sureties are approved. 
Dated 
V JL O JL 
WASH. CO GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
Plaintiff 
^ t f v U pi UddU 
vs. 
I2-3"&C> Defendant(s) 
(include address and DOB) 







An order was made on the date of -V^>i <\\ v ~2-H , \Q ?.S hy the above court, 
that the defendant be held to answer upon a charge of [YU -X 
Bail was set in the amount of $ Fiof HundredFM* Fro* bolldit 
We, the undersigned H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER, of 
Logan, Utah, Cache County, State of Utah, jointh and severally undertake that 
the defendant rNsMfri\*«mfMWrw UVusWUi will appear and answer the charge 
mentioned above in whatever court it may be presented, and that he will at all 
times hold himself amenable to the orders and proceedings of the court, including 
all appearances required of him by the court up to and including his surrender in 
execution of any sentence irrespective of any contrary provision contained herein, 
or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that he will pay to the plantiff 
the sum of $ 6b&.^K ; and if the defendant does not make payment after 
the forfeiture of the bond, judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff and 
against us as sureties for the amount set forth. 
We hereby submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably 
appoint the clerk of the court as our agent upon whom any papers affecting our 
liability on this undertaking may be served, and that our liability may be inforced 
on motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of 
an independent action. 
1 1 - • • . , -
i • '•''• - • • '• r > y . x . - , «\- ,. - \j_i , ^ ^ ^ 
! . - > 
Surety Surely 
H.C. HENINGER DORIS W. HENINGER 
,-FFIDAVn 





Sureties9 names and addresses: 
H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER 
746 North 100 West Logan, Utah 84321 
The sureties whose names are subscribed to the above undertaking, being sworn, 
each for himself, says: that he is a real or personal property holder within the 
State of Utah, and is worth the sum in the undertaking specified as the penalty 
thereof, over and above all his just debts and liabilities, exclusive of property 
exempt from execution. 
I 
/L/LLT ^ . / ' * ' ~> _ > s l ' . - » \ , . •> -i i 
\ ' Surety \ Surety 
H.C. HENINGER ^ DORIS W. HENINGER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date of 
Notary Public^  * 
is 
Nota 
\ » ^ " r*— / (Seal)
 hiding
 at A ^ T T V ^ ^ - V .J- M n 
My commission expires - - \ t'^i I./ ^ 
The above undertaking is hereby accepted, and the sureties are approved. 
Dated 
Circuit Judfte 
V - ^ i i w *-**«, 





(include address and DOB) 







A n order was made on the date of P**> /& ^ ^ by the above court, 
that the defendant be held to answer upon a charge of _ 0 ul 




We, the undersigned H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER, of 
in. Utah, Cache County, State of Utah, jointly and severally undertake that 
JL will appear and answer the charge 
mentioned above in whatever court it may be presented, and that he will at all 
times hold himself amenable to the orders and proceedings of the court, including 
all appearances required of him by the court up to and including his surrender in 
execution of any sentence irrespective of any contrary provision contained herein, 
or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that he will pay to the plantiff 
the sum of $ <s\<T**^ ; and if the defendant does not make payment after 
the forfeiture of the bond, judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff and 
against us as sureties for the amount set forth. 
We hereby submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably 
appoint the clerk of the court as our agent upon whom any papers affecting our 
liability on this undertaking may be served, and that our liability may be inforced 
on motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of 
an independent action. 
w 
u
 r HENINGER 
/£ iJj. I SI 
urety 
DORIS W. HENINGER 
/T 
AFFIDAVIT 





Sureties' names and addresses: 
H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER 
746 North 100 West Logan, Utah 84321 
The sureties whose names are subscribed to the above undertaking, being sworn, 
each for himself, says: that he is a real or personal property holder within the 
State of Utah, and is worth the sum in the undertaking specified as the penalty 
thereof, over and above all his just debts and liabilities, exclusive of property 
exempt from execution. 
^4L I 5ur*^—00"*T l Surety m4/Vtai T 7 
H.C. HENINGER > - / DORIS W. HENINGER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date of 
\ . W '\.s'<% « t 
Notary Public 
\. .1 - • ' — ~ l 
(Seal) B,disn.fl V • ; , • \ '. v Residing at. 
My commission expires. 
The above undertaking is hereby accepted, and the sureties are approved. 
Dated 
"^itvMiit ludce 
